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Abstract— This paper studies a two-player game with a
quantitative surveillance requirement on an adversarial target
moving in a discrete state space and a secondary objective to
maximize short-term visibility of the environment. We impose
the surveillance requirement as a temporal logic constraint.
We then use a greedy approach to determine vantage points
that optimize a notion of information gain, namely, the number
of newly-seen states. By using a convolutional neural network
trained on a class of environments, we can efficiently approx-
imate the information gain at each potential vantage point.
Subsequent vantage points are chosen such that moving to that
location will not jeopardize the surveillance requirement, re-
gardless of any future action chosen by the target. Our method
combines guarantees of correctness from formal methods with
the scalability of machine learning to provide an efficient
approach for surveillance-constrained visibility optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the use of autonomous agents, such
as unmanned aerial vehicles, for patrolling and surveillance
in adversarial environments has increased tremendously [1],
[2]. In such settings, it is often necessary to not only perform
routine patrolling of the area but also to maintain visibility of
potentially hostile targets until an appropriate response can
be formed. Thus, an autonomous agent has two objectives.
Throughout the operation, it must maintain line-of-sight
visibility of, or otherwise track, a moving target. Second, the
agent may also need to maximize its visibility of the environ-
ment, prioritizing areas which it has not recently observed.
Simply, the agent needs to optimally patrol an environment
subject to the constraint of a surveillance requirement on a
moving target.
There is significant amount of existing work on design-
ing strategies for autonomous patrolling agents in known
environments [3]–[7] and unknown environments [8]–[15].
However, in these cases, the agents are merely passive
observers. When a hostile target is detected, the agents
simply inform a human operator (for example via a live
camera feed) who will take over from then on. However, in
practice, targets could be lost after detection and thus need to
be actively tracked by the autonomous agent. In this paper,
we treat the patrol problem as finding and visiting a set of
discrete locations that provides visibility of the whole map.
Such an optimization problem can be seen as an instance of
the art gallery problem, which has been shown to be NP-hard
[16].
The surveillance of adversarial targets is naturally formu-
lated as a two-player game. There have been several variants
The University of Texas at Austin
1 {sudab,bwu3,utopcu}@utexas.edu
2 {louis,ytsai}@oden.utexas.edu
of such games studied in [17], [18], including the case
in which the environment is not known apriori [19], [20].
These settings, however, only handle a simple surveillance
requirement, namely to never lose sight of the target. For
example, in [21] the authors formulate the problem as a
two-player game in which both players choose their controls
at initial time and proceed until the target is able to hide.
If this requirement is relaxed, the agent may not always
observe, or even know, the exact location of the target. In
this case, surveillance is, by its very nature, captured by a
partial-information two-player game.
While there has been a lot of work on both surveillance
and patrolling individually, there has been very little on
the combination of the two problems. To bridge this gap,
this paper proposes a method for maximizing the visibility
of the environment for the patrol objective while actively
maintaining knowledge of the location of a hostile target
for the surveillance objective. We provide a quantitative
guarantee on surveillance performance.
Over an infinite time horizon, the agent must be able to
prevent its uncertainty of the target’s location from exceeding
a user-defined threshold. The approach taken in this paper is
closely related to the framework established in [22] and [23]
where a surveillance game is formulated as a GR(1) synthesis
problem. However, no patrolling objective is considered in
[22] nor [23]. Another salient difference is that we do not
want to synthesize a single strategy, but instead generate
a winning region. Within the winning region, the agent is
guaranteed to not violate the surveillance specification. We
use the winning region as a constraint for the patrol task to
guarantee correctness of the surveillance requirement.
For maximizing visibility in large-scale environments, we
leverage the efficiency of data-driven techniques to deter-
mine approximately-optimal locations for the agent to move
towards. We adopt the approach from [24], where a neural
network is used to approximate a gain function that quantifies
map visibility. However, the approach in [24] does not
consider any surveillance requirements and focuses purely on
visibility optimization. We constrain the generation of these
locations at runtime to guarantee the correctness with respect
to a surveillance specification. The concept of guaranteeing
correctness on systems with different goals is studied in the
field of runtime verification [25], [26] where a winning set is
computed offline and actions that take the system out of the
set are overwritten at runtime. We employ this in principle
as new locations are computed greedily at runtime, such that
those new locations must stay in the winning region.
Our contribution is summarized as follows:
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1) We propose a scalable algorithm to approximately-
optimally explore an environment while guaranteeing
a quantitative surveillance specification.
2) We employ machine learning to generate locations that
maximize visibility in large-scale discrete environments.
Formal verification techniques are often not able to
handle similar state space sizes [27]. We develop an
abstraction method to reduce the state space of a
discrete environment. We show that the abstraction is
sound which guarantees that if a strategy is correct on an
abstract environment, it is also correct on the underlying
concrete environment. We are thus able to leverage the
scalability of machine learning with the guarantees of
formal methods.
3) We present a simulation on a case study and benchmark
on various sizes of state spaces to demonstrate the
scalability of the proposed approach.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the
problem informally in the context of a case study. Section
III provides notations and definitions for the surveillance
game structures. The patrol problem constrained with a
surveillance specification is formally constructed in Section
IV and the solution approach is given in Section V. We
present a method to generate a sound abstraction of a large
discretized state space in Section VI and provide numerical
evaluations in Section VII. Finally, we conclude in Section
VIII and discuss avenues of future research.
II. GAME STRUCTURE
A. Environment
We represent the environment, an example of which is
shown in Figure 1a, as a set of states L. We define L ⊆ L
as the set of states representing free space and Lc = L \
L representing the obstacles. For example, in Figure 1b, L
corresponds to all the white cells and Lc corresponds to the
obstacles in red.
(a) Surveillance arena (b) Gridworld representation
Fig. 1: Sample environment and corresponding gridworld
representation. The blue circle corresponds to the controlled
agent and the orange circle corresponds to the hostile target.
Red cells are obstacles that obscure vision. Black cells in (b)
correspond to occlusions.
B. Surveillance games
We define a surveillance game to be a tuple G = (G, vis)
with G = (S, s0, δ), where:
• S = La × Lt is the set of states, with La the set of
locations of the agent, and Lt the locations of the target;
• sinit = (linita , l
init
t ) is the initial state;
• δ ⊆ S × S is the transition relation describing the
possible moves of the agent and the target; and
• vis : S → B is a function that maps a state (la, lt) to
true iff position lt is in sight of la.
The relation δ captures the next allowed move of both
the target and the agent, where the target moves first and
the agent moves second. For a state (la, lt) we define
succt(la, lt) as the set of possible successor states of the
target. We extend succt to sets of states of the target by
stipulating that the set succt(la, L) consists of all possible
successor states of the target for states in {la}×L. Formally,
let succt(la, L) =
⋃
lt∈L succt(la, lt).
For a state (la, lt) and a successor location of the target l′t,
we denote with succa(la, lt, l′t) the set of successor locations
of the agent, given that the target moves to l′t:
succa(la, lt, l
′
t) = {l′a ∈ La | δ(la, lt) = (l′a, l′t)}.
C. Belief-set game structures
For surveillance games, when the agent cannot see the
target, we need to reason about the belief the agent has
in the location of the target. To this end, we employ a
powerset construction which is commonly used to transform
a partial-information game into a perfect-information one, by
explicitly tracking the knowledge the agent has as a set of
possible locations of the target.
Given a set B, we denote with P(B) = {B′ | B′ ⊆ B}
the powerset (set of all subsets) of B.
For a surveillance game G = (G, vis) we define the cor-
responding belief-set game structure Gbelief = (Gbelief , vis)
where Gbelief = (Sbelief , sinitbelief , δbelief) where:
• Sbelief = La×P(Lt) is the set of states, with La the set
of locations of the agent, and P(Lt) the set of belief sets
describing information about the location of the target;
• sinitbelief = (lainit , Btinit) is the initial state;
• δbelief : Sbelief × Sbelief is the transition relation where
δbelief(la, Bt) = (l
′
a, B
′
t) iff l
′
a ∈ succa(la, lt, l′t) for
some lt ∈ Bt and l′t ∈ B′t and one of these holds:
(1) B′t = {l′t}, l′t ∈ succt(la, Bt), vis(la, l′t) = true;
(2) B′t = {l′t ∈ succt(la, Bt) | vis(la, l′t) = false}.
A run ρ in the game Gbelief is an infinite sequence
ρ = (la0 , Bt0), (la1 , Bt1) . . . of states in Sbelief , where
(la0 , Bt0) = (lainit , Btinit) = s
init
belief , δbelief((lai , Bti), σi) =
(lai+1 , Bti+1) for all i. A strategy for the agent in Gbelief is a
function fa : Sbelief ×P(Lt)→ Sbelief that maps the history
of the play and the current belief of the target location to the
agent’s next action.
D. Temporal surveillance objectives
We consider a set of surveillance predicates SP = {pk |
k ∈ N>0}, where for k ∈ N>0 we say that a state (la, Bt) in
the belief game structure satisfies pk (denoted (la, Bt) |= pk)
iff |{lt ∈ Bt | vis(la, lt) = false}| ≤ k. Informally, a state
in the belief game satisfies pk if the size of the belief set
does not exceed the threshold k ∈ N>0.
Of focus in this paper will be linear temporal logic
(LTL) surveillance formulas of the form pk, termed safety
surveillance objective which is satisfied if at each point in
time the size of the belief set does not exceed k.
LTL formulas of this type are interpreted over (infinite)
runs. If a run ρ satisfies an LTL formula ϕ, we write ρ |= ϕ.
The formal definition of LTL semantics can be found in [28].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Patrol problem
Consider an environment as in Figure 1 represented by
a set L, with a set L ⊆ L of free states. We construct
a surveillance game structure G = (G, vis) with G =
(S, s0,Σ, δ). Recall that S = La×Lt is the joint state space
of the target and agent. We assume without loss of generality
that La = Lt = L, i.e., both target and agent share the same
state space, which is natural in the setting where both the
agent and target can move in the same discretized space.
Given the visibility function vis , let Vvis(l) ⊆ L be the
set of points in L that are visible from l ∈ L, i.e.,
Vvis(l) := {lt ∈ L | vis(l, lt) = true}.
We first present the patrol problem studied in [24].
Problem 1: Find the smallest set O ⊆ L of vantage points
such that each point in L is visible from at least one vantage
point l ∈ O, i.e.,
min
O
|O| s.t.
⋃
l∈O
Vvis(l) = L.
This problem was solved in [24], by using a greedy
approach to determine vantage points sequentially; i.e., a new
vantage point is determined based on the visibility of the
map obtained from the previous vantage points. Each new
point is chosen to maximize information gain. In this case,
since we deal with discrete state spaces, the information gain
is quantified as the number of previously-unseen states that
become visible after moving to a potential vantage point li.
We define this gain function as:
gK(li; Ω
i
i−K) = |Vvis(li) ∪ Ωii−K | − |Ωii−K |, (1)
where Ωii−K represents the set of visible points for the last
K observations:
Ωii−K =
i⋃
j=i−K
Vvis(lj).
We enforce that i − K = 0 when i ≤ K. When K =
∞, the agent remembers everything it sees and patrolling is
complete when all the states in the map have been seen at
least once. When K is finite, the agent has to try to observe
states it has not seen in the last K steps. In the next section,
we discuss the patrol problem with finite K.
Example 1: Figure 2 shows a visualization of the gain
function for the environment shown in Figure 1a.
Unfortunately, computing gK(l; Ωii−K) is costly. For each
l, computing the gain function requires O(|L|) operations.
Thus computing the gain for all l ∈ L has complexity
(a) Obstacles and visibility
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(b) Gain function
Fig. 2: (a) Black regions are obstacles. White regions are
visible from the red dot. Light gray regions are visible from
the cross, but not from the dot. The area of light gray
region corresponds to the gain at the cross. (b) The gain
function (normalized for visualization), given that the dot
has been visited. The cross marks the location of maximum
information gain.
O(|L|2) [24]. The computation becomes prohibitively ex-
pensive, especially for large state spaces. It is worth noting
that this computation cannot be performed offline as it will
depend on the choices of the target at run time.
B. Constrained patrol problem
We first provide some additional notation. We note that
to help readability and avoid nested subscripts, we slightly
abuse notation by dropping the subscripts a, t in the state
si = (lai , Bti). The state in the belief-set game at time
i is referred to in this section as (li, Bi). Given a belief-
set game Gbelief = (Gbelief , vis), let ρ = s0, s1, · · · =
(l0, B0), (l1, B1), . . . be an infinite run in the belief game
Gbelief . We define ρij = ((lj , Bj), . . . (li, Bi)) with j < i
as the finite word in the infinite run from j to i. We can
thus write the infinite run as ρ = ρj−10 · ρij · ρωi+1 and
denote ρj−10 = (l0, B0), . . . (lj−1, Bj−1) as a finite prefix and
ρωi+1 = (li+1, Bi+1), (li+2, Bi+2), . . . as an infinite suffix.
We are interested in constraining the patrol problem with the
addition of a surveillance requirement. However, recall that
the temporal surveillance objectives are only satisfied over
infinite runs. This setting differs from the approach in [24] in
that it now involves an infinite time horizon. We thus want
to maximize the short-term visibility in a time interval of
length K in order to incentivize the agent to gain visibility
of states it has not seen from the last K vantage points.
We construct a sequentially optimal vantage point gener-
ation problem. Simply, given the current state of the belief
game (li, Bi) and an integer K > 0, we want to choose the
next vantage point that maximizes the visibility of states that
have not been seen by the last K vantage points and does
not violate the surveillance safety specification ϕ.
We now present the main problem of this paper.
Problem 2: Given a belief-set surveillance game Gbelief ,
at time step i− 1, the run in the game is ρi−10 . Additionally,
given K ∈ N, and a surveillance requirement ϕ, solve
arg max
li
gK(li; Ω
i
i−K) s.t. ρ |= ϕ
where ρ = ρi−10 ·(li, Bi)·ρωi+i for all Bi ∈ succt(li−1, Bi−1).
Informally the agent needs to choose the next vantage
point that guarantees the infinite suffix will still be correct
with respect to the surveillance specification regardless of
the target’s action choices.
In the next section we present how to translate the
constraint on the infinite suffix as a feasible set for the
optimization problem. The resulting optimization problem
needs to be solved online for every time step. As discussed
previously, evaluating the exact gain function for all feasible
points is a computationally intensive task. We thus show how
to approximate the gain function using a convolutional neural
network which allows for the generation of the next vantage
point in real time even for large maps.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
A. Surveillance winning region
Consider a pair (G,ϕ), where G is a surveillance game
structure and ϕ is a surveillance objective. Given the relevant
surveillance predicates and specification over the belief-set
game structure Gbelief , we obtain a safety game.
A safety game defines a set F ⊆ L×P(L) of safe states.
A run ρ |= ϕ iff si ∈ F for all i ≥ 0, i.e., if only safe states
are visited in the run. Otherwise, ρ 2 ϕ. The winning region
W ⊆ F is the set of states from which a winning strategy
exists. Informally a state (la, Bt) in the belief game is said
to be in the winning region W iff, for all future steps the
target can make from the current belief state Bt, there exists
a strategy from la that guarantees that only states in W will
be visited. We can use standard algorithms for safety games
(e.g. [29]), to compute the winning region.
We note that to avoid the state space blow-up arising from
the subset construction in the partial information game, we
solve the surveillance games using the belief-set abstraction
techniques detailed in [22].
B. Feasible set construction
Synthesizing a strategy for a surveillance specification is
inherently reactive, the agent observes the target’s action
and reacts appropriately in order to satisfy its specification.
However, planning only the immediate action, as is done in
[22], will not result in a large gain in visibility coverage.
Informally, we want to be able to move to the best vantage
point possible in a region that guarantees that no matter what
the target does in the future, there will always exist a way
for the agent to satisfy its surveillance requirement.
More concretely, consider the belief-set game Gbelief
along with a surveillance specification ϕ. Assume we
have solved the resulting safety game and computed
the winning region W ⊆ L × P(L). Recall that the
state of the belief-set game structure is the joint po-
sition and belief s = (la, Bt). We extend the defi-
nition of succa(la, lt, l′t) to sets by stipulating that the
set succa(la, Bt) =
⋃
l′t∈succt(la,Bt) succa(la, Bt, l
′
t). Ad-
ditionally, we extend the definition of succt(la, Bt) to
more than the immediate successor by recursively defining
succkt (la, Bt) =
⋃
B′t∈succk−1t (la,Bt) succt(la, Bt).
We now define the reachable successor set R(la, Bt) as
R(la, Bt) = {l′a ∈ L | la ∈ succa(la, Bt),
∀B′t ∈ succt(la, Bt), (l′a, B′t) ∈ W}. (2)
Informally, a successor state l′a is a reachable successor of
(la, Bt) if, for all possible successor belief states B′t, we have
that (l′a, B
′
t) does not violate the surveillance specification.
A state being in the set R(la, Bt) a strict condition – the
same successor state l′a has to be correct for all possible B
′
t
choices the target can make.
We can then recursively define reachable successor set
over a finite horizon k, by applying Equation 2 k times:
Rk(la, Bt) = {l′a ∈
⋃
la∈Rk−1
succa(la, Bt) |
∀B′t ∈ succkt (la, Bt), (l′a, B′t) ∈ W}.
Intuitively, as k gets larger, finding a point l ∈ L that
guarantees staying in the winning region W gets harder. We
define k∗, the largest k such that Rk
∗+1 = Rk and refer to
the set as the maximum reachability set R∗(la, Bt).
Remark: Computing the set R∗ is similar to standard
fixed point set computations detailed in [30] for computing
the winning region W in temporal logic synthesis problems.
The main difference is that these algorithms focus on com-
puting a set where for all actions by a player there exists
a strategy for the other player to win. We are interested in
reversing the order of the quantifiers which results in a more
restrictive condition. One can think of k∗ as the maximum
number of actions the agent can make without ”reacting” to
the target’s actions and still guaranteeing correctness with
regards to the specification.
The reachable set computation can be performed online in
O(|L×P(L)|2). However, if required, the entire computation
can be performed offline with complexity O(|L × P(L)|4),
and the results stored for all possible states – there will be
a set R∗ stored for up to |L× P(L)| states.
We now present an equivalent version of Problem 2 with
the constraint on the infinite run translated to a feasible set.
Given that the state of the game at time i is (li, Bi), the next
vantage point is the solution to the following problem:
Problem 3: Given a belief-set surveillance game Gbelief at
time i− 1, K ∈ N, and a surveillance requirement ϕ, solve
arg max
l∈R∗(li−1,Bi−1)
gK(li; Ω
i
i−K)
where (li−1, Bi−1) is the state in the game at t = i− 1.
C. Approximating the gain function
When the state space is large, computing the gain function
is computationally expensive. In such cases, we approximate
gK(li; Ω
i
i−K) using a convolutional neural network which
enables efficient computation of the gain function at run time.
Without loss of generality, we discuss the training process
for K = ∞. The approximated gain function gθ(li; Ωi0, Bi)
takes as input the cumulatively visible set Ωi0, and the
associated shadow boundaries Bi = ∂Ωi0 \LC . Here, ∂Ωi0 is
boundary of the set of states visible from at least one of the
previous vantage points. Intuitively, the shadow boundaries
(or frontiers) Bi are the boundaries between free space and
occlusion. In order to train the neural network, we sample
different environments L cropped from the INRIA Aerial
Image Labeling Dataset [31]. For each L, an initial position
l0 ∈ L ⊆ L for the agent is randomly sampled. We train on
100k corresponding data pairs {(Ωi0,Bi), g(li; Ωi0)}.
Each subsequent li after the initial position is chosen as
li = arg max
l
g(l; Ωi−10 ).
The parameters θ of the neural network are updated to
minimize the cross entropy loss E
(
g(li; Ω
i
0), gθ(li; Ω
i
0,Bi)
)
between the normalized exact gain function g and the nor-
malized prediction gθ, where E is defined as
E(p, q) :=
∫
p(x) log q(x) + (1− p(x)) log(1− q(x)) dx.
The architecture of gθ is based on U-Net [32], a stan-
dard CNN for dense inference problems which aggregates
information across various scales using skip connections. The
network has nineteen 3x3 convolution layers, each followed
by batch norm and leaky ReLU. Six of the convolutions use
stride 2 for downsampling, while six are preceded by bilinear
upsampling. For more details we refer the reader to [24].
At run time, we approximate the gain function using gθ,
which is measure of how useful it is to place a new vantage
point at l. Since not all l are reachable due to the surveillance
constraint, we restrict gθ to be zero for l outside R∗. The
next vantage point is chosen as the point within the R∗ that
maximizes gθ and this process is repeated for all time.
V. SURVEILLANCE GAME ABSTRACTION
In order to scale to large state spaces, we present a
conservative abstraction of the surveillance game G with
visibility function vis . We first define an abstraction function.
Abstraction function: Given an environment with state
space L, an abstraction function ψ : L → 2L yields a
partition Lψ = l1, . . . , ln of the state space L with
⋃n
i=1 li =
L and ∀ i 6= j we have li ∩ lj = ∅.
Theorem 1: Given concrete surveillance game G =
(G, vis), we say the abstract surveillance game Gψ =
(Gψ, visψ) with Gψ = (Sψ, s0ψ,Σ, δψ), and sψ = (laψ, ltψ)
with laψ, l
t
ψ ∈ Lψ , generated by abstraction function ψ is
sound if the following holds
1) δψ(sψ, σ) = s′ψ with s
′
ψ = (l
a′
ψ , l
t′
ψ) iff
• For all la ∈ laψ in the concrete game, it must be
the case that δ((la, lt), σ) = (l′a, l
′
t) with either
l′a ∈ la
′
ψ or l
′
a ∈ laψ . Or equivalently, we require
there does not exist la ∈ laψ such that l′a /∈ la
′
ψ and
l′a /∈ laψ .
• There exists an lt ∈ ltψ in the concrete game, such
that δ((la, lt), σ) = (l′a, l
′
t) with l
′
t ∈ lt
′
ψ .
2) visψ((laψ, l
t
ψ)) = > iff for all (la, lt) ∈ (laψ, ltψ) we
have vis(la, lt) = >.
Simply, the abstract version of the surveillance game gives
more power to the target and removes power from the agent
by disallowing transitions between abstract states for the
agent if it is not possible for all underlying concrete states.
Conversely transitions between abstract states are allowed
for the target if there exists a corresponding transition in any
of the underlying concrete states.
Example 2: Figure 1 shows an example of abstracting a
concrete map with a large state space to a coarser represen-
tation. Each grid state in Figure 1b represents a collection of
pixels from Figure 1a.
This construction of the abstraction guarantees that a
strategy that is correct on the abstract game with respect
to safety surveillance objective ϕ corresponds to a winning
strategy on the concrete game. However, since the abstrac-
tion is conservative, not finding a winning strategy on the
abstraction does not mean one does not exist in the concrete
game. In the experiments that follow in the next section, we
use these abstractions to reduce the size of the state space
for the winning region computation in the safety game.
Remark: The methodology detailed in this paper in-
troduces several sources of conservatism – state abstraction
shown in this section and the belief abstraction in [22] used in
generating strategies. These allow for more scalable synthesis
on large problems. However, due to the added conservatism,
there is no guarantee that there exists a winning strategy
in the abstract model, even if one does exist in the con-
crete models. Techniques such as counterexample guided
abstraction refinement (CEGAR) can be used to generate
new abstractions if no winning strategy can be found.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
A. Effectiveness of patrol
In order to illustrate the efficacy of including the vision-
maximization for the patrol problem, we compare an agent
employing the surveillance constrained patrol method with
a window of K = 5 to an agent following a pure safety
surveillance strategy. We compare the receding gain — the
ratio of newly seen states (that have not been seen in the last
K = 5 steps), to the total number of traversable states in the
map.
Figure 4 shows the results of the comparison. We note that
when no patrol optimization is enforced, the agent tends to
stay still as it is sufficient to maintain surveillance of the
target. This causes no new states to be seen and results in
the value of the receding gain to be zero for much of the
time. Meanwhile, when visibility-maximization is taken into
account, the agent actively moves to the best vantage point
it can safely reach. The sum of gain over the time period is
2.07 when patrol optimization is performed vs 0.52 for the
pure surveillance case. This corresponds to average gain of
3.4% per time step vs 0.8%.
(a) t = 0 (b) t = 10 (c) t = 16 (d) t = 20 (e) t = 24 (f) t = 33
Fig. 3: Simulation of the case study presented in Section II. The green cells correspond to the path to the optimal vantage
point which is the last green square on the path. Snapshots of when a new vantage point is recomputed is shown here.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the effects of visibility optimization.
Adding the patrol objective drastically increases the agent’s
visibility of the environment.
Finally, we remark that when the agent in the pure
surveillance case stays still for longer than K steps, all states
not in its current vision become unseen states. Hence, when
it finally moves, the gain becomes high, causing the spikes.
B. Motivating case study
Here we present the results of solving the case study
presented in Section II with surveillance requirement p ≤ 1
– which corresponds to not allowing the agent to lose sight
of the target. We assume the agent can move 4 cells for
every 1 cell the target can move. The target is controlled by
a human moving it with the arrow keys on a keyboard.
We have implemented the simulation in Python, using the
slugs reactive synthesis tool [33] to solve the safety game and
find the winning regionW . The experiments were performed
on an Intel i5-5300U 2.30 GHz CPU with 8 GB of RAM.
We solve for the winning surveillance region on the 32× 32
abstraction shown in Figure 1b. New vantage points and the
paths to those points were computed at each snapshot shown
in Figure 3 in green, and took approximately ≈ 1 second for
each new computation. Once the agent reaches the vantage
point, the next one is computed and this process is repeated.
We see that the agent can leverage its superior speed to move
away from the target in order to see new areas, but it is still
able to keep sight of the target at all times. A video of the
simulation can be seen at https://bit.ly/2F2Vnjb.
Table I: Comparison of gain function computation time (secs)
for various map sizes. Using the exact gain function quickly
becomes prohibitively expensive.
Grid size
642 1282 2562 5122 10242
Exact 0.499 2.565 36.234 597.797 8105.750
CNN 0.058 0.071 0.126 0.334 1.194
C. Computation benchmarks
Here we compare the process on various sized maps in
order to demonstrate the scalability of using a CNN to
compute the gain function. See Table I for a comparison of
computation time for the gain function. The CNN computes
the gain function within 1 second for maps up to 1024×1024.
Meanwhile, the exact gain function computation already
takes more than 1 second for 128×128 maps and more than
2 hours for 1024× 1024 maps. The scalability is crucial as
the vantage point computation is conducted online on the
concrete environment, compared to the surveillance strategy
synthesis which is performed offline on an abstraction.
We measure the effectiveness of the gain function pre-
diction by the decay of the residual, i.e. the number of
steps required to reduce the occlusions to a certain threshold.
The exact computation and CNN approximation generated
sequences of vantage points that converged to the same level
of coverage in a comparable number of steps. For a more
detailed discussion on the evaluation of the gain function
approximation, we refer the reader to [24].
D. Discussion
We are able to generate approximately optimal vantage
points in real time for very large scale maps. Due to
restricting the search space of these vantage points through
the winning region in a surveillance game, we are also able
to guarantee correctness on these large-scale maps.
We note that for illustration, the experiments shown here
use a simple surveillance specification ϕ = p1 which
means the agent cannot lose sight of the target. We provide
additional examples and animations with looser surveil-
lance requirements at http://visibility.page.
link/evasion.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a framework for constraining patrol strate-
gies to be formally correct with respect to a surveillance
requirement defined as a temporal logic constraint. Our ap-
proach is flexible as it allows a user to tailor the surveillance
requirement for their specific application. Using convolu-
tional neural networks, we compute a measure of information
gain which prioritizes observing states that have not been
seen for a given time interval. We choose the next vantage
point as the location within the maximal reach set R∗ that
optimizes the gain function. We show that employing the
patrol strategy leads to better visibility of the environment,
as measured by a receding gain metric.
For future work, we will extend the framework to handle
the case of exploration, where the environment is initially un-
known. We also plan to consider more sophisticated surveil-
lance requirements, such as surveillance liveness objectives,
where, infinitely often, the agent must keep the uncertainty
of the target’s location below a predefined threshold.
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